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Resumen Este artículo examina la evolución de los sistemas de partidos de Europa Oriental y Cen-
tral hacia la división emergente entre las fuerzas pro-UE y euroescépticas y presenta 
una visión revisada de la división tradicional de centro-periferia en seis países: Polonia, 
Hungría, República Checa, Eslovaquia, Bulgaria y Rumania. La primera parte discute 
el enfoque espacial de Rokkan, la segunda desarrolla una visión revisada de la escisión 
centro-periferia en relación con el espacio a nivel regional, y la tercera analiza la compe-
tencia de los partidos en términos de europeísmo y euroescepticismo en los sistemas de 
partidos de Europa Central y Oriental.
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Abstract The paper examines the evolution of Eastern and Central European party systems to the 
emergent division between pro-EU and Eurosceptic forces and puts forward a revised 
view of the traditional centre-periphery cleavage in six countries: Poland, Hungary, the 
Czech Republic, Slovakia, Bulgaria and Romania. The first part discusses the Rokkan 
spatial approach, the second develops a revised view of centre-periphery cleavage in re-
lation to space at the regional level, and the third analyzes party competition in terms of 
Europeism and Euroscepticism in Eastern and Central European party systems.
Keywords Party system, europeanism, euroscepticism.
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Introduction Fifty years ago, Albert O. Hirschman identified, with the term’s exit, voice and loyalty, 
three possible strategies that citizens could undertake regarding their membership of 
an organization, whether it was a company, a political party or a state (Hirshman, 1970). 
More recently, the term “Brexit” has brought to mind the concrete possibility that this 
relationship of belonging, between citizen and a supranational political organization, 
can be concluded through an “exit”.
Although the English case is still an extraordinary event today, it is true that the growth 
of European integration has given rise to contestation and opposition. The European 
project has generated novel institutions, complex processes and a whole realm of regula-
tory policy while generating debate, discourse and division. While it has created its own 
domestic policies, these have not been created in a vacuum. As Taggart and Szczerbiak 
(2001) pointed out:
The associational politics of parties and party systems, and the processes connected with 
them, force the issue into certain configurations and have the effect of patterning conflict. 
Looking at the nature of Euroscepticism therefore means looking at how domestic politics 
structure one part of the process of European integration. But it also means that we can use 
the European issue to illuminate deeper lines of division within the party system, between 
the core and periphery, between the embattled centre and the alienated outer rim. In short, 
studying Euroscepticism tells us something about European integration and tells us much 
about party politics (pp. 5-6).
The presence of Europeism/Euroscepticism cleavage in the context of national party 
systems is confirmed by the results of the last two European Parliamentary elections 
(2014-2019), which showed three strictly related phenomena: 
 ♦ a broad electoral abstentionism, that involved all the EU’s member states and streng-
thened the public opinion’s alienation from the European institutions
 ♦ a growth of Euro-sceptical parties also in the Western and Southern European coun-
tries (i.e. Front National in France; UK Independence Party in the United Kingdom; AFD 
in Germany; Syriza and Golden Down in Greece; League and Five Stars Movement in 
Italy; Podemos and Vox in Spain)
 ♦ a widespread national requirement to renegotiate the terms of the Treaty on the 
functioning of the European Union. 
The third point, in particular, threatens to cross the division line between smaller and 
larger European member state, involving a deeper conflict between the German centre 
of European economic power, on one hand, and the rest of Europe on the other. 
In this perspective, any satisfactory empirical analysis of the impact of the Europeism/
Euroscepticism cleavage within the East and Central Europe party system involves the 
solution of three closely related problems, namely the question of ‘space’, the theore-
tical background of cleavage in comparative analysis and a revised conception of the 
centre-periphery cleavage in line with the post-communist political context. The core 
concept here is a definition of space in terms of territorial and cultural boundaries.
This paper considers six countries (Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, 
Bulgaria and Romania) and explains the evolution of the Eastern and Central European 
party systems to the emergent division between pro-EU and Eurosceptic forces on 
the basis of a revised view of traditional centre-periphery cleavage. All the countries 
examined are former Soviet Union satellites, democracies that emerged after the fall 
of the Berlin Wall and current EU member states. The study is divided into three parts. 
57RELASPExit, Voice and Loyalty: Europeism and Euroscepticism in Eastern and Central European Party SystemsBarbara Pisciotta  |  pp. 55-65
The first introduces the Stein Rokkan spatial approach, the second suggests a broader 
conception of the centre-periphery cleavage in relation to regional space and the third 
analyzes Eastern and Central European party competition in terms of Europeism/
Euroscepticism.
The notion of space As is known, Rokkan argues that there is a connection between major cleavages and 
national and industrial revolutions. Lipset and Rokkan (1967) suggest that three condi-
tions must be met if a cleavage is to become politically salient. First, the cleavage must 
distinguish people on at least one potentially important characteristic. Second, indivi-
duals must know which group to identify with on any characteristic. Third and most im-
portantly, political parties must organise support and competition around the cleavage, 
thus giving it institutional expression.
In this regard, Rokkan’s (1970) concept of cleavage -understood as a long-term structu-
ral conflict capable of creating organised and opposing political alignments (Bartolini 
and Mair, 1990; Allardt and Pesonen, 1967; Rae and Taylor, 1970; Lawson, Römmele and 
Karasimeonov, 1999; Bartolini, 2000; McAllister and White, 2007)- highlights the pro-
cess of political, economic and cultural differentiation whereby it is possible to divide 
the members of a community into groups. The nature and intensity of the mechanisms 
of cohesion and solidarity that are established among those who claim a common iden-
tity, which can pertain to race, ethnicity, religious creed or social status, stimulate a 
process of mobilisation of the forces belonging to each group, which are channelled into 
the creation of organisations with formal structures, like political parties. 
More specifically, in defining the centre-periphery cleavage, Rokkan gives importance 
to ‘space’ in terms of geographical space (location) and membership space (social and 
political dimensions: community, identity, cultural values). As he argues, it is very easy 
to cross geographical borders but not so easy to cross the membership line, which en-
tails abandoning one’s original cultural identity, adopting another and being accepted 
by the new group. Space is related in his analysis to the formation of territorial units in 
Europe and the consequent establishment of state boundaries. In a broader analytical 
sense, a boundary is a line of demarcation between territorial or membership groups. 
In this perspective, the term is used to indicate the focal point for delimiting a territory 
or group and identifying both territorial groups and membership groups. As Bartolini 
(2005) points out, an economic boundary defines an area of free market transactions 
(economic rights, property rights, a common currency and the mobility of factors of 
production); a cultural boundary defines a space characterised by the traits of the mem-
bership group (nation, race, language, ethnic features); a politico-administrative boun-
dary delimits the territory on the basis of regulatory regimes (social and political rights, 
education, labour market); and a military boundary delimits the territory on the basis of 
extraction-coercion agency and capacity.
While the building of boundaries sets the costs of barriers for various types of tran-
sactions across local communities, membership groups and territorial entities, exit 
(Hirsh man, 1970)  is the act of crossing a boundary. This means that the ability to control 
the crossing of boundaries corresponds to the formation of a centre. Bartolini (2005) 
emphasises the striking correspondence between Rokkan’s macro-level link between 
external boundary control and internal political structuring and Hirschman’s micro-le-
vel relationship between exit options and propensity to voice. On this view, conflicts 
over the demarcation of boundaries reflect clashes of interests among the social groups 
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controlling different resources within each territory. The centre-formation process pro-
vides two basic lines of conflict: dominant cultural groups versus ethnically, linguisticly 
or religiously distinct subject populations and the attempt by the centre to standardise 
and mobilise remote peripheral territories.
In terms of political power, centre and periphery can be defined by their spatial po-
sitions and political interests. The centre is identified as the core location of military, 
economic and cultural power, the place of political decisions and policy-making process 
and the seat of the ruling class, whereas the periphery is the territory subordinate to 
the military, economic and cultural power of the centre, the place at a distance from the 
policy-making process, and where the population is dependent on political decisions. As 
we shall see, the spatial approach inherent in the centre-periphery cleavage provides the 
starting point for analysis of this cleavage in a broader sense.
A new conception 
of centre-periphery 
cleavage
Centre-periphery cleavage will be used here to describe an asymmetrical relation 
between two different entities (Zarycki, 2002; Blahó, 2012) that can assume different 
forms, such as North and South at the global level, western and eastern at the regional, 
and the ethnic minority and majority division at the national. In other words, centre 
and periphery denote the different places of two subjects in connection with their own 
spatial position at the national, regional and global level. This means that the power of 
the centre is not only the power of a national government imposing a dominant culture 
in order to standardise the national language or control the media but is also reflected in 
unequal interactions between different places in the world in terms of cultural, political 
and economic position. The centre-periphery cleavage can therefore be interpreted 
in terms of three different dimensions, the first being the classic conflict between the 
central culture of the modern nation state and its peripheries, the second the economic 
and political dominance of the Soviet Union over its satellite countries during the 
bipolar international system, and the third the asymmetrical relations between the 
European Union, regarded as the centre, and the peripheral Eastern European member 
states. All three of these dimensions of the centre-periphery cleavage have influenced 
the evolution and consolidation of the Eastern European party systems. 
The availability of exit and voice to support cultural identity or political and economic 
power against the centre structures the channels of the periphery’s political participa-
tion and organisation. Political parties are therefore a critical element in the translation 
of social cleavages into political divisions and examination of their role will tell us a 
great deal about the trajectory of these emerging conflicts.
The following analysis suggests a revised view of the centre-periphery cleavage in terms 
of organised conflict originating from the EU and East European member states (regio-
nal level). The regional sphere can postulate a clear divide between internal and external 
and hence between state and supranational organization. This level refers to the institutio-
nal influence -understood in procedural and organisational terms- that the European 
Union has been capable of exercising on its member states. As we will see, the conditions 
of access and the standards imposed for continuing membership have helped to modi-
fy the positions of some parties and their interaction in terms of pro-Europeanism vs. 
Euroscepticism. 
Given the above premises, the aim of this study is to explain the evolution of the Eastern 
European party systems in terms of the impact of Europeism/Euroscepticism  cleavage on 
party alignments. To this end, the area-based comparison commences with the empirical 
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verification of the possible presence of centre-periphery cleavage by ascertaining the 
simultaneous existence of three conditions: the development of conflict arising from 
pressures exerted by the centre to bring the periphery into line; awareness on the part 
of the periphery of its diversity and of the existence of political, economic and cultural 
interests incompatible with those of the centre; and the periphery’s ability to mobilise and 
organise itself so as to compete with the centre. More specifically, the EU accession process 
highlights the differing interests of larger and smaller member states, thus leading many 
Eastern European parties to move from loyalty to voice and/or exit strategy.
The regional level The asymmetrical relations between the European Union and Eastern European mem ber 
states can be understood in terms of the timing of accession, economical and po li tical 
reforms (conditionality) and the defence of national interests and national so vereignty 
(Mayhew, 2000; Bardi et al., 2002). Many Eastern European leaders, including Klaus, 
Orban and the Kaczynski brothers, have claimed that the accession process and policy-
making in accordance with the Copenhagen criteria are aimed at protecting the economic 
interests of the larger states (Germany and France). After the Soviet experience, many 
Eastern European countries are afraid of being absorbed by the EU machine and various 
segments of society therefore feel largely extraneous to the European project (Hix and 
Lord, 1997; marks and Hooghe, 1999; Henderson, 1999; Lubbers and Scheepers, 2007). 
By integrating the classification of Taggart and Szczerbiak (hard or soft Euroscepticism) 
(Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2001; Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2008) with Hirschman’s 
strate gies, it is possible to place East European parties in three categories. The first 
corresponds to the exit, coincides with hard Euroscepticism and implies the rejection 
of the entire project. In most cases, the parties that choose this strategy support the 
request for a referendum to verify their country’s public opinion on whether to stay or 
leave the EU. The second strategy, namely voice, represents the soft Eurosceptic position 
and involves contingent or qualified opposition to specific European issues and policies. 
The objectives of this strategy aim to reform the structure and rules of the EU through 
a wide range of voices, ranging from the refusal to apply certain community directives 
to the attempt to radical reform in an intergovernmental sense of certain policies (think 
immigration). Finally, the third is expressed by loyalty and coincides with a markedly 
European propensity, founded on the conviction that the solution to the challenges 
pose d to the EU cannot ignore the search for a common position.
Other studies put forward a binary classification based on whether the parties support 
or oppose the integration process and identify three recurrent dimensions as regards the 
stance of each unit on the issue of for or against the EU (Hooghe et al., 2002). The first is 
socio-economic and regards the presence of a strong link between position on the left or 
right and support for or opposition to the EU, where fiscal policy in particular tends to 
simplify the lines of division and strengthen the competition between social democrats, 
who advocate the European model of regulated capitalism, and neo-liberalists, who are 
closer to the model of intergovernmental deregulation. The second regards the emergen-
ce of new political issues concerned with lifestyle, the environment, cultural diversity, 
nationalism and immigration. In this perspective, clear-cut opposition to the process of 
supranational integration, perceived as an alienating, liberalist mechanism, is expres-
sed not only by extreme left-wing parties, communists, environmentalists and social li-
bertarians but also by populist, nationalist and xenophobic formations of the far right. 
It should be noted, however, that in recent years the strengthening of new right-wing 
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parties in both the East and the West has been the result of an increased perception of 
challenges that threaten the national community, such as immigration, foreign cultural 
influences, the tendency to fall in with the dominant Anglo-Saxon model (in terms of 
language, for example) and the influence of international organisations. The European 
Union is seen by these parties not only as encapsulating all these threats but also as wor-
king to undermine state sovereignty and slash the power of national governments. 
The third dimension introduces a distinction between parties in government and oppo-
sition, suggesting a programmatic strategy aimed at maximising support and addressing 
specific issues for and against the EU only when the contingent situation permits. In ge-
neral terms, a tendency is assumed to adopt moderate policies and/or support the EU 
when in government and the opposite when in opposition (Rohrschneider and White, 
2007; Rohrschneider and White, 2015).
The data of the Chapel Hill Expert Survey of 2017, applied to the last elections, make it 
possible to present an overall picture of the positions adopted by the various Eastern Eu-
ropean parties in relation to whether they are Eurosceptic or pro-European, right-wing 
or left-wing and in government or the opposition (table 1).1 As regards the last point, the 
parties that have never been part of a coalition government are indicated in bold. 
1. See the appendix at the end of the 
paper.
Table 1: Euroscepticism in East and Central Europe party systems
Country Hard euroscepticism
Soft 
euroscepticism Europeanism
% Last elections (soft and hard 
eurosceptics, total)
Bulgaria
left
right
Czech Republic
left
right
Hungary
left
right
Poland
left
right
Romania
left
right
Slovakia
left
right
UP VOLYA
KSCM
SPD
 JOBBIK
KWN
SNS L’SNS 
ODS   ANO 
FIDESZ 
PIS 
SAS OL SME-RO
BSP DPS
GERB 
CSSD
Pirate KDU-CSL TOP09
MSZP LMP DK
 SLD
PSL KO
PSD
UDMR PNL USR ALDE PMP
SMER-SD
     MH SIET
13.6
59.3
68.4
50.4
-
46.5
Data revised by the author
Empirical analysis confirms the rise of Euroscepticism in the post-communist area on the 
left-right spectrum. In particular, many of the most important Eastern European right 
parties, including the Civic Democratic Party, FIDESZ and Law and Justice, have adopted 
a Eurosceptic position. On the contrary, nearly all the reformed former-communist par-
ties have continued to support the EU (with the exception of the SMER, which has some-
times adopted a more critical stance). 
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The data bear out the initial hypothesis of Hooghe and colleagues as regards: 
 ♦ the soft Euroscepticism of the parties that are more openly neo-liberalist (ODS), con-
servative and/or populist (FIDESZ, PIS, SME-RO, SAS, OL)
 ♦ the hard Euroscepticism of the far right (UP, SPD, JOBBIK, KWN, SNS, L’SNS) and 
the far left (KSCM). 
To sum up, the hard Euroscepticism column is occupied exclusively by extremist par-
ties, a trend seen both in the stabilization of some far-right groups (JOBBIK, SNS) and 
extreme left (KSCM), and by the creation of new entities with strongly nationalist and 
xenophobic propensities throughout the area (UP, SPD, KWN and L ‘SNS). The pro-
Euro peanism column is instead occupied by parties of a primarily social democratic or 
moderate parties (BSP, CSSD, MSZP, LMP, DK, SLD, PSD, SMER-SD), with the addition 
of some liberal/conservative (GERB, PNL, KO, USR, ALDE, MP, SIET), Christian demo-
cratic (KDU-CSL, PSL, PMP) and ethnic (DPS, UDMR, MH) formations. 
Confirmation of the hypothesis of a more pro-European attitude on the part of parties 
in government instead appears less obvious, as the column of soft Euroscepticism pro-
ves to contain all the parties that have led or been part of government coalitions for lon-
ger or shorter periods of time with only two exceptions. It is also true, on the contrary, 
that nearly all the pro-European formations have been in government. The Eurosceptic 
strategy, at least in its hard version, does appear, however, to be nearly always adopted 
by parties that know they have no chance of taking power and therefore not only have 
nothing to lose in electoral terms but can even hope to gain votes in extraordinary situa-
tions of economic crisis, migratory pressures and threats to the sovereignty of the state. 
This trend was confirmed by the opposition from the most extremist groups, except 
for brief periods of external support for governments for coalitional reasons (KSCM, 
JOBBIK, SNS, UP).
In Poland, Slovakia and the Czech Republic for example, but also in Greece, Spain and 
Italy (Verney and Bosco, 2013) the dynamics of party competition shows an increase of 
Euroscepticism in relation to the economic consequences of EU integration (Szczerbiak, 
2008; Hanley, 2008; Markowski and Tucker, 2010). While the adoption in the Czech 
Republic of Eurosceptic and pro-European stances, respectively by liberal and social 
democrat parties, is something grafted onto the party alignments without altering them, 
the situation appears more complex in Poland and Slovakia, where the economic factor 
of Euroscepticism does not produce bipolar competition between pro-European social 
democrats and Eurosceptic liberal-conservatives. Although the last Polish parliamentary 
elections (October 2019) helped to partially realign the pro-European/Eurosceptic 
competition on the right/left axis, thanks to the return of the SLD with 12.5%, it must 
be emphasized that it is the SLD, the only group on the left in Poland, from 2005 to 2011 
fluctuated between 13.15% and 8.24% and in 2015 failed to get any seats at the Sejm. As 
a result, the Eurosceptic and pro-European division in Poland is found mainly among 
right-wing groups. In Slovakia, if we consider that the SMER maintains a more critical 
position towards the EU than its eastern European counterparts, only the Hungarian 
minority, the Christian democrat and moderate parties are openly pro-EU (see the new 
SIET - Network). This means that in both countries the pro/anti-EU cleavage not only 
cuts across left/right alignments but also strengthens the competition between secular-
liberal and Catholic-populist forces in Poland. It alters relationships between social 
democrats, nationalists and ethnic parties in Slovakia, where these forces in the past 
have been part of and are still members of the same coalition government. 
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Hungary is an exception (Batory, 2008), as the consolidation of the Hungarian national 
identity and state sovereignty is perceived in marked contrast to a supranational insti-
tution such as the European Union. At the same time, the economic consequences of 
EU integration have fostered the spread of conservative (FIDESZ) and/or xenophobic 
(JOBBIK) views. In the case of Hungary, however, as in the Czech Republic, the pro/anti-
EU cleavage is consolidated within the sphere of the left/right division. 
Bulgaria and Romania constitute two different cases in that none of the moderate right-
wing parties has adopted a Eurosceptic stance. In both countries competition of an 
ethnic character does not appear to have given way to competition for and against the 
EU for three reasons: 
 ♦ the national issue is still important (Bulgaria)
 ♦ the major parties of the right and the left are seeking further legitimisation at the 
national and international levels through support for European values, while it is the 
more extremist parties that have opted for opposition to EU (UP, VOLYA)
 ♦ general scepticism on the part of citizens as to the ability of national institutions to 
cope with emergency situations, not least because they have requested direct inter-
vention on the part of the European Commission. 
This happened, for example, in Romania during the institutional crisis of 2012, and has 
influenced support for the more pro-European parties.2
On the whole, therefore, the evidence of Eastern and Central European support for Eu-
roscepticism among both opposition and government parties confirms the presence of 
some powerful strategic incentives to express domestic party competition in terms of a 
pro-EU/anti-EU divide. This involves the question of national interests as against supra-
national European power but also the perception that EU rhetoric masks the economic 
interests of its core. 
2. It should be noted that the voting 
turnout in Romania is one of the 
lowest in Europe, with only 39.2% 
at the general election in 2008 and 
41.6% in 2012.
Conclusions In East and Central Europe there is a line of continuity connecting the present-day forms 
of Euroscepticism with the need felt to secure independence; first from Moscow and now 
from Brussels. Today the centre-periphery cleavage is the most concrete manifestation 
of the succession of asymmetric relations that has seen the state in Eastern Europe fight 
for independence from the Soviet empire, defend the national territory against claims at 
the sub-state level and defend national sovereignty against the imposition of European 
parameters.
In this context, the move between exit and voice has fueled the creation of new barriers 
in two opposite but closely connected directions. The first barrier, which goes from the 
bottom upwards, is represented by the attempts of Member States to tilt EU policies in 
their favor and openly challenge the interests of the strongest countries. The second, from 
top to bottom, has manifested as the need to close national borders to immigration. This 
double closure to the outside world has had a disruptive impact on party alignments in all 
European countries and has brought into focus the centrality of the division caused by the 
presence of irreconcilable national interests - economic, political and strategic - all in a 
European ‘space’ that should be shared. 
In conclusion, it is suggested here that the power relationship between two different 
entities is determined by the position each can occupy in its national, regional or global 
space, and the political struggle between who holds the ‘centre’ and who remains on 
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the periphery of the system influences political competition and characterises the party 
system. This probably means today that examination of the pro-EU/Eurosceptic divide 
could shed a great deal of light on the political divisions within party systems not only 
in the post-communist area but also in Western and Southern Europe, as shown by the 
cases of the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Spain, Greece and Italy.
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